

Message Text

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12

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 SAJ-01 NIC-01 TRSE-00

OMB-01 SR-02 ORM-03 DRC-01 /167 W

----- 062562

R 010845Z DEC 73

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 663

INFO USINT ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 639

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IZ, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET-IRAQI RELATIONS

1. NOV 27-30 VISIT OF SOVIET DEL HEADED BY SECRETARY OF
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF CPSU BORIS PONOMARYOV SEEN HERE AS LONG
OVERDUE SOVIET EFFORT TO MOLLIFY GOI AND LESSEN IMPACT OF
POLICY DIFKERENCES THAT HAVE DEVELOPED SINCE OCTOBER WAR.
ALTHOUGH DEL RECEIVED RED CARPET TREATMENT AND PRESS AGAIN
BEGAN SPEAKING OF "STRATEGIC ALLIANCE", DIFFERENCES ON MID-
EAST SETTLEMENT HAVE BECOME TOO OBVIOUS EVEN FOR IRAQ'S CON-
TROLLED PRESS TO IGNORE.

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2. RECENT INDICATIONS OF IRAQI PIQUE WITH USSR INCLUDE RENEWED ACTIVITY WITH PRC (SEPTEL) AND, ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR, REFUSAL OF PRESIDENT BAKR TO GIVE SOVIET AMBASSADOR LIKHACHEV APPOINTMENT DESPITE REQUEST OF OVER ONE WEEK. MAJOR POLICY DIFFERENCES APPEAR TO CENTER ON FOLLOWING:

3. IRAQI LEADERS INCENSED BY FAILURE SOVIETS TO CONSULT THEM DURING WAR. SOVIET DEMARCHES TO PERSUADE IRAQ TO LEAVE TROOPS IC SYRIA APPARENTLY HAD SOME EFFECT, BUT PUBLICLY IRAQ HAS ANOUNCED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL UNITS. (EGYPTIAN COUNSELLOR CLAIMS SOME UNITS ARE STILL THERE.) SOVIET AMBASSADOR TOLD LEBANESE AMBASSADOR HE HAD REQUESTED MEETING 4 HOURS BEFORE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON OCT 22, BUT HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN AUDIENCE.

4. IRAQ'S REJECTION OF RESOLUTIONS 338 AND 242. IN PAST, IRAQIS HAVE TOLD SOVIETS AND EGYPTIANU PRIVATELY THAT THEY ACCEPTED 242 BUT COULD NOT SAY SO PUBLICLY FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS. IRAQ'S CURRENT PUBLIC POSITION IS EVEN MORE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO COMPROMISE ON PALESTINE QUESTION. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF GOI'S DE FACTO POLICY HAS ALSO SHIFTED.

5. ROLE OF PALESTINIANS. ON PARTY LEVEL IRAQ CONTINUES TO SUPPORT EXTREME GROUPS LIKE PFLP (GENERAL COMMAND) AND PDFLP. IRAQ WAS DISTURBED BY VISIT OF ARAFAT-LED GROUP TO MOSCOW, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE IT FEARS SOVIETS WILL SUCCEED IN UNIFYING AND DOMINATING MOVEMENT, PARTS OF WHICH BAATH HAVE USED TO ADVANCE ITS PRETENTIONS FOR ARAB LEADERSHIP. ONLY PAPER TO MENTION ARAFAT VISIT TO MOSCOW WAS COMMUNIST TARIQ ASH-SHAAB.

6. ROLE OF ICP. ACIVITY OF ICP HAS BECOME WORRISOME TO GOI SINCE ITS INLUSION IN NATIONAL FRONT FOUR MONTHS AGO. GOI COUNTS ON SOVIETS TO CONTAIN ITS ACTIVITIES ANDIPARTY ACCORD SIGNED DURING PONOMARYOV VISIT SUGGESTS SOVIETS PREPARED TO SACRIFICE ICP TO BILATERAL RELATIONS.

7. JOINT PRESS STATEMENT ON VISIT TO BE ISSUED DEC 2. ONLY SIGNED DOCUMENT DURING VISIT WAS PLAN FOR BAATH-CPSU COOPERATION. NO DETAILS RELEASED BUT IN SPEECHES BOTH SIDES CONFIDENTIAL

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STRESSED LEADERSHIP ROLE OF BAATH PARTY WITH NO MENTION OF ICP OR PREVIOUSLY HAILEDINATIONAL FRONT. OTHER PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF VISIT WERE EXCHANGE OF BREZHNEV-BAKR LETTERS,PONOMARYOV TV ADDRESS, AND SOVIET DEL MEETINGS WITH KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND ICP LEADERS. ON FIRST READING, VISIT DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE RESOLVED ABOVE DIFFERENCES.

8. SUBSEQUENT TO PREPARATION OF ABOVE, TURKISH AMB TOLD

IRAQIS HAD REQUESTED MORE SOVIET ARMS, PARTICULARLY SPARE PARTS WHICH THEY HAD LACKED DURING OCTOBER WAR. SOVIETS HAD RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT WHERE ARMS WOULD BE UTILIZED. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER SOVIETS HAD MADE NEW COMMITMENT. LOWRIE

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